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Abstract
This  paper  set  out  to  determine  the  factors  that  discriminate  most  in  the 
classification of banks into sound and unsound position using method of discriminant 
analysis.  Data used were sourced from the annual  report  of the Nigerian deposit  and 
insurance corporation. The findings revealed the order of severity of institutional factors 
that could lead to bank distress. The none performing loans to total  loans contributed 
about  53.4%  of  the  total  discriminant  scores  while  capital  to  risk  weighted  asset 
contributed 19 percent to the group separation of the discriminant function. Others, gross 
loan to  deposit  ratio  (with 14.34%), average liquidity ratio  (with 9.25%) and insured 
deposit to total deposit (with 3.76%) made little discriminating contributions while the 
rest  of  the  variables  made  insignificant  contributions.  Thus,  by  this  reason  of 
contribution,  the  25%  non  scientifically  determined  (and  subjective  based  judgment) 
component weight attached to asset quality in the CAMEL rating should be increased to 
at  least  1/3 (30%) of the total  weight  components  since its  components  are found to 
dominate the discriminant score.           
Keywords : Soundness, Unsoundness, Bank Distress, Non Performing Loan, Capital to Risk 
Weighted Assets, CAMEL, Discriminant Analysis.
Introduction 
In ordinary parlance, the word ‘distress’ connotes unhealthy situation, 
inability or state of weakness inhibiting the achievement of a set up goal. 
Distress in the banking industry occurs when a fairly reasonable proportion 
of banks in the system are unable to meet their obligations to their customers 
as well as their owners and the economy (CBN/NDIC, 1995). In Nigeria, the 
case of distress stopped featuring prominently in 2004.  
Banks have dual obligations of maximum liquidity to their depositors 
and maximum profitability to their shareholders. Maximum liquidity can be 
attained at the cost of no profit since idle cash is barren and does not yield 
any interest, while profitability can be achieved only at the cost of illiquidity 
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since hard assets are usually the most illiquid of banks’ assets. Hard assets 
otherwise called the less liquid assets are usually made up of investments, 
loans and advances (Nwankwo, 1980).
Though banks earn some income through charges, such as, charges on 
operating  the  current  account,  providing  safe-deposit  boxes,  remittance 
facilities  to their  customers;  the bulk of  the commercial  banks’ profits  – 
more than 75 percent of the profit is however earned from interest on loans 
and investment which the banks make using the money belonging to their 
depositors. (Vaish, 1977). It is therefore reasonable to expect banks to carry 
out in their portfolio, a sizeable proportion of loans and advances since they 
attract the highest rate of return. However, that a bank has invested too much 
in interest – bearing assets and/or that some of its investments in loans and 
advances are not recovered, compel the bank to finding itself incapable of 
paying back its depositors’ money – a situation which could precipitate a run 
on the bank and consequently lead to banks’ failure (Okpara 1997). Since 
most of the liabilities of the commercial banks are payable on demand, the 
banks as a precaution against unanticipated withdrawals by customers keep 
cash  reserves equally in a  certain fraction or  percentage of  its  total  cash 
deposit liabilities. 
According to Okpara (2008) distresses in the banking system  as well 
as  outright  bank failure are as  old as the invention of  banking operation 
itself. For instance, there were catastrophic bank failures in the United States 
of  America  in  the  1930s  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in  the  countries  of  the 
organization  for  economic  cooperation  and  development  (OECD)  in  the 
seventies and eighties. In the light of this, Ogunleye (2006) noted that no 
country was immune to the wave of financial sector crisis in the 1980s and 
1990s and stressed that reports have it, that two – third of member countries 
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of the international  monetary fund (IMF) both developed and developing 
country members, had significant banking problems. In 1985, over 900 of 
the nearly 15,000 banks in the U.S. were on regulators problem lists. Two of 
Canada’s  14  banks  failed,  while  Japan’s  largest  mutual  bank  had  to  be 
rescued (NDIC, 1999).  
Nigeria is not an exception. In 1899, the Anglo – African Bank was 
established but on account of hard time, merged with the BBWA in 1912. In 
1925  Barclays  Bank  Dominion  Colonial  and  oversee  was  formed  and  it 
absorbed  the  colonial  bank  which  sprang  up  in  1917  into  an  integrated 
international bank. The first indigenous bank, the industrial and commercial 
bank was  established  in  1929.  This  bank however  could  not  survive  the 
financial and management challenges and was forced out of the race in 1930. 
Another indigenous bank, the Nigerian Mercantile Bank came up in March 
1931 but liquidated and closed down in 1936 owing to similar  problem. 
Many banks sprang up “between” 1933 – 1952. Between February 1951 and 
May 1952 alone, seventeen indigenous banks were registered but most of 
them could not withstand the taste of the days and therefore collapsed. Thus, 
between 1930 and 1958 over 21 bank failures were recorded. These years 
however marked the era of free banking in Nigeria (Okpara 2008). 
The era of supervision, examination and control of banks in Nigeria 
which  started  with  the  bank  ordinance  of  1952  and  its  subsequent 
amendments, was not without bank crisis. The radical changes in financial 
developments  in  1987  brought  about  by  the  Structural  Adjustment 
Programme of 1986 did not prevent bank crisis. The said innovations of the 
CBN in 1986 has not been able to provide enough backbone for the financial 
industry as reflected by the down turn in the events of late 1980s which were 
characterized  by the  unprecedented  level  of  distress  as  reflected  in  large 
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volume of non-performing loans, insolvency, liquidity problem and default 
in  meeting  depositors  and  inter-bank  obligations.  This  poor  state  of  the 
banking  system  was  exposed  in  1989  with  the  government  directive  to 
withdraw the deposits of governments and other public sector institutions 
from banks to CBN. Thus, bank distress became obvious and increased from 
7  in  1989  to  a  peak  of  60  in  1995  while  the  amount  required  for 
recapitalization of distressed banks increased from N1.1 billion in 1989 to 
N30.5 billion in 1995, N43.9 billion in 1996 while peaking at N98.1 billion 
in 2004. Non-performing loans for the distress banks increased from N2.9 
billion to N29.5 billion in 1994 and 1995, and increased further to N40.7 
billion in 1997 while peaking at N149.6 billion in 2004. 
Precisely,  the  Nigerian  banking  industry  in  1994  operated  in  an 
environment that was not very conducive. On the economic front, the nation 
continued to witness high rate of inflation, balance of payments problems, 
high debt burden, low productivity, industrial unrest and general economic 
decline. In addition, the socio – political uncertainties in 1994 compounded 
the economic situation. As would be expected, these led to a decline in the 
general performance of banks during the year under review (NDIC, 1994 ). 
Recorded also in that year was the high number of commercial banks 
involving in frauds and forgeries. All these put together led to a decline in 
the general performance of banks during the year under review. 
With government’s resolve to address the political, economic as well 
as  distress  problem  in  the  industry,  the  banking  system  showed  some 
positive responses in the late 1998 till the year 2000 (NDIC 1998, table 1). 
However, in 2001 the CBN tightened monetary policy to stem the liquidity 
surge  arising  from  expansionary  fiscal  operations  of  the  3  tiers  of 
government  due  to  renewed  emphasis  of  fiscal  federalism.  The  CBN 
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progressively raised its minimum rediscount rate (MRR) by 650 basis points 
from 14.0 percent to 20.5 percent, yet inflation rate still rose sharply from 
6.9% in  2000 to  18.9% in 2001.  (See  NDIC 2001;  ix,  7).  This  singular 
measure has negative spillover  effect  on the banking system whose total 
loans and advances increased from N519 billion in 2000 to N803 billion in 
2001.  The  distressed  bank’s  loans  and  advances  increased  from  N26.4 
billion in  2000 to N123.1 billion in  2001 and by 2004 rose  to  N191.24 
billion.  While  the  non  performing  loans  of  the  distressed  banks  rose 
increasingly from N29 billion in 2000 to N149.6 billion in 2004 (see table 1 
and 2). The reason for not extending the data to the recent yeas is for the 
sake of capturing the severe bank distress periods that stopped in the year 
2004.
Table 1 Loans and Non-performing Loans Indices in the Banking Industry 
(1989-2004)
Loans  and  Advances 
(N billion)  
Non-Performing  Loans 
and  Advances   (N 
billion)
Proportion  of  Non-
Performing    Loans 
and Advances to Total 
Loans (N billion)
Year Industry Distressed Industry Distressed Industry Distressed
1989 23.1 4.3 9.4 2.9 40.8 76.1
1990 27.0 6.4 11.9 4.7 44.1 72.8
1991 32.9 5.4 12.8 4.1 39.0 76.5
1992 41.4 15.7 18.8 6.8 45.5 43.0
1993 80.4 25.3 32.9 14.7 41.0 58.0
1994 109.0 54.6 46.9 29.5 43.0 64.6
1995 175.9 48.9 57.8 29.5 32.9 68.9
1996 213.6 51.7 72.4 33.9 33.9 75.5
1997 290.4 49.6 74.9 40.7 25.81 81.92
1998 327.2 24.2 63.3 18.7 19.3 77.3
1999 370.2 29.1 24.8 21.0 25.6 72.2
2000 519.0 26.4 111.6 29.0 21.5 75.8
2001 803.0 123.1 135.7 35.4 16.9 28.9
5
2002 938.63 102.4 199.6 40.0 21.27 39.06
2003 1205.03 129.9 260.19 98.4 21.59 76.7
2004 1519.76 191.24 350.82 149.6 23.08 79.2
Source: NDIC Annual Report and Bank Returns
Table 2 Performance indices in the Banking Subsector (1990-2004)
Year Total 
Number 
of Banks
Number of 
banks  in 
distress 
Deposits  of 
Distressed 
banks  to  total 
deposits  in 
banking 
industry (%)
Assets  of 
Distressed 
banks  to 
total  assets 
in  banking 
industry (%) 
Amount 
required  for 
recapitalization 
of  Distressed 
banks  (N’ 
billion )
1990 107 9 14.6 23.7 2.0
1991 119 8 4.4 16.4 2.4
1992 120 16 18.1 20.9 2.4
1993 120 33 19.2 18.6 23.6
1994 116 55 29.4 18.6 23.4
1995 115 60 14.1 19.8 30.5
1996 115 50 14.7 11.0 43.9
1997 115 47 9.0 7.6 42.8
1998 89 15 3.5 3.9 15.5
1999 90 13 1.6 1.5 15.3
2000 89 12 2.5 20.0 10.3
2001 90 9 2.0 3.0 12.1
2002 94 NA 7.2 5.74 20.6
2003 89 NA 4.9 4.7 79.7
2004 89 NA 6.0 5.4 98.1
Source: NDIC Annual Report and Bank Returns
 
The CBN asserted that many of the banks were still in distress and if 
allowed  to  fail  woefully,  the  ensuing  confidence  crisis  might  lead  to 
disintermediation, demonetization, a collapse of the payment system and a 
serious depression of the economy (Soludo, 2004). Thus, CBN came up in 
July 2004 with recapitalization policy of raising the mandatory minimum 
capital  base  of  N2 billion to  a  new mandatory  minimum of  N25 billion 
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before or on December 2005. Okpara (2009) in his research paper however, 
figured out that the raising of capital base to N25 billion could be necessary 
but not a sufficient measure to averting a run on banks. According to him, 
the  factored  out  critical  factors  namely,  undue  interference  from  board 
members, political crisis, undercapitalization and fraudulent practices must 
be dealt with if bank failures must be brought to control in Nigeria.
This paper however will set out to determine the institutional factors 
that discriminate most in the classification of banks into sound and unsound 
(distress) position. 
Review of Literature
So  many  authors,  regulatory  and  supervisory  institutions  have 
identified similar factors leading to unsoundness of banks in Nigeria.
Odejimi,  (1992)  contended  that  the  major  factors  responsible  for  the 
precarious financial  condition of the banks were huge uncollectible loans 
and  advances,  the  financing  of  long-term  assets  with  short-term  funds; 
overtrading,  unsound  management  practices  and  reliance  on  volatile 
deposits.  Okpara (1997)  saw loan default  as  one  of  the  major  causes  of 
distress  and  identified  factors  such  as  wrong  appraisal  techniques, 
interference by owners or banks top officials who may even obtain loans 
without collaterals, delay in the approval and disbursement of loans which 
most  often  help  to  fuel  loan  defaults;  mischanneling  of  loan  funds  and 
dubious  character  of  the  borrowers  as  catalyzing  loan  default.  The 
collaborative study of distress by CBN and NDIC identified and weighted 
factors such as
* bad loans and advances 
* fraudulent practices 
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* undercapitalization 
* rapid changes in government policies
* bad management 
* lack of adequate supervision and 
* undue reliance on forex
While brandishing factors like economic depression, political crisis, 
bad debt and undue interference from board members as been responsible 
for banks being severely distressed (CBN/NDIC 1995).
Okpara (2009) noted that the general institutional factors that led to 
the identified factors on the banking system could be discussed as insiders 
abuse,  weak  corporate  governance,  weak  risk  asset  management  and 
inadequacy  of  capital.  In  his  empirical  analysis,  however,  four  critical 
endogenous and exogeneous factors were identified. These factors are 
* undue interference from board members 
* political crisis 
* undercapitalization and 
* fraudulent practices 
Adeyemi (2007) in his practical observation noted that twenty four out 
of the eighty-nine deposit money banks that existed then exhibited one form 
of  weakness  or  the  other.  Prominently,  undercapitalization  and/or 
insolvency,  illiquidity,  poor  asset  quality,  weak  corporate  governance, 
boardroom squabbles,  dwindling earnings and in some cases loss making 
were  asserted  by  him as  being  commonly  associated  with  the  distressed 
banks. In the face of this difficulty, some of the banks went into rent-seeking 
and non banking businesses that were not related to core banking functions.
Ebong (2004) observed that most banks in the country had a capital 
base of less than US$ 10 million. According to him, the capital base of the 
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largest  bank before the reforms,  was about  US$526 million compared to 
Malaysia where the smallest bank had a capital base of US$526 million. The 
small size of most Nigerian banks coupled with their high overheads and 
operating expenses, had serious repercussions for the cost of intermediation. 
As a result of this, many of then could not meet clients’ request for funding. 
Other problems that called for consolidation programme include:
* Heavy  reliance  on  government  patronage  as  the  public  sector  
accounted for over 20% of aggregate deposits in the industry. For  
some banks, the dependent ratio was as high as 50%.
* Weak  corporate  governance;  as  number  of  Board  members  and  
management  staff of banks were more interested in pursuing their  
private  or  narrowly defined interests  even at  the detriment  of  the  
corporate goals and objectives of the banks they serve.
* The relative ease of entry owing to low capital requirement resulted to 
unhealthy competition that led the banks to unethical and non-core  
banking business  like  trading  in  foreign  exchange and  sometimes  
indirect importation of goods. These practices boomeranged on banks
(Soludo, 2004).
Soyibo, Alashi and Ahmed (2004) contended that among the number 
of potential causes of distress in banks are poor management,  inadequate 
capital base, fraud, and insider abuse by management and board members. 
Others are poor asset and liability management, macroeconomic instability, 
political instability/interference, inadequate legal frameworks and structures, 
and poor regulation and supervision. Competition, overly aggressive pursuit 
of  growth,  and excessive  risk-taking can also  contribute  to  bank distress 
(CBN/NDIC, 1995; Comptroller of the Currency, 1988; Short et al., 1985). 
These factors have occasioned the weighted average of the scores on the 
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various components of CAMEL parameters currently in use for identifying 
distress.  The  different  factors  and  scoring  weights  attached  to  them are 
shown in table 3 as follows.
Table 3. Weight of CAMEL Factors in use in Nigeria
  Factor Component Component Factor 
Weight (%) weight (%)
1.Capital a. Capital to risk assets ratio          15
b. adjusted capital ratio          5
c. Capital growth rate                      5 25
2. Asset quality a. Non-performing risk assets to 
    Total risk assets         15
b. Reserve for losses to non-
    performing risk assets            5
c. Non-performing risk assets to
     capital and reserves            5    25
3. Management a   CAEL/85 *            5 
b. Compliance with laws/
     regulations         10    15
4. Earnings a. Profit sector tax to total
    assets 5
b. Total expenses to total 
     income 5
c. Net interest income to total 
    earning assets 5
d. Interest expenses to total 
     earning assets 5       20
5. Liquidity a. liquidity ratio 5
b. Net loans and advances to
     total deposits  5
c. Volatile dependence ratio 5         15
Total 100
Notes:
*CAEL/85 is composite scores for capital, Assets, Earnings and Liquidity divided by 85, 
* Net of interest in suspense.  
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 Source: Central Bank of Nigeria
Capital to risk asset ratio as well as non-performing risk assets to total 
risk  assets  have  the  highest  weights  of  15%  each.  This  is  followed  by 
compliance with laws/regulations that is assigned the component weight of 
10%, the rest has 5 component weight each. However, these weights are not 
scientifically determined but are based on subjective judgment yet they form 
the bedrock rating system for the supervisory and regulating authorities. 
By the total score of the composite rating, banks are classified very 
sound,  sound,  satisfactory,  marginal  and  unsound.  The  classification  is 
shown in table 4 below. Banks rated A and B are said to be very sound and 
sound respectively. The classification is presented in table 4 below.
Table 4: Bank Classification Based on the Composite Scheme 
Class Composite score (%) Rating  Alphabetical rating 
A 86-100 Very sound A
B 71-85 Sound B
C 56-70 Satisfactory C
D 41-55 Marginal D
E 0-40 Unsound E
Source: Soyibo, Alashi and Ahmad 2004.
A  bank  with  a  “C”  rating  is  one  whose  financial  condition  is 
fundamentally  sound  and  stable  and  which  should  be  able  to  withstand 
business  fluctuations.  Its  adverse  findings  are  minor  and  can  simply  be 
corrected through supervision. A bank rated “D” is classified as marginal 
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and  may  have  some  serious  financial  weaknesses  that  may  not  be 
satisfactorily  addressed.  Such  ailing  bank  is  placed  under  prudential 
management and close supervisory attention to correct its deficiencies and 
return it to normalcy. 
Lastly, banks rated “E” are classified as “unsound”. Such banks are in 
coma and have immediate probability of failure; as they are bedecked with 
severe weaknesses,  critical  and precarious conditions.  To avert  the banks 
from  total  failure,  urgent  assistance  from  the  owners  or  other  financial 
institutions becomes necessary.
Poor management is perhaps the greatest cause of bank failure. The 
comptroller of the Currency (1988) ascribed over 90% of bank failures since 
deregulation  in  the  United  State  to  poor  management  and  other  internal 
problems. Managerial decisions to accept risk also play an important role in 
the determination of bank failures. Poor management resulting from wrong 
appraisal  technique can lead to high non performing loans and advances, 
high ratio of non performing loans to total loans. It can also lead to reduction 
in asset value, (owing to non performing hard assets), chop into the capital 
base (owing to frauds) and cause a drop in the volume of deposits resulting 
from depositors’ loss of confidence. The deteriorated assets and capital will 
now call  for  recapitalization.  Any  amount  of  capital  if  not  under  proper 
management can be eroded to inadequacy. 
The dividend (or retention) policy in the managerial finance function 
requires  that  a  proportion  of  earnings  be  apportioned  to  shareholders  as 
remuneration  for  their  capital  and  the  rest  retained  to  plough  into  the 
business  to  enhance  the  capital  base.  The  proper  implementation  of  this 
requires managerial acumen. Also investment decision, financing decision 
and current asset management are exclusive finance functions that require 
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expertise  and  honesty  in  discharge.  Thus,  management  is  vital  to  the 
performance of the banks.  
Materials and Methods
Discriminant analysis technique which classifies an observation into failed 
or non-failed dummy variables will be employed to evaluate the model. the 
estimated centriod for sound and unsound banks will be compared while the 
contributions  of  the  variables  of  the  total  discriminant  scores  will  be 
estimated in percentage form. To ascertain the reliability of the discriminant 
function, the Eigenvalue, the canonical correlation, the Wilk’s Lambda and 
the Chi statistic of the discriminant  function will all be evaluated.
Grouping of the banks into two is based on classification of the banks 
into sound and unsound. Industry’s data are used as proxy for the sound 
banks. The data are sourced from the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(NDIC) Annual Report and Statement of Accounts. The sound banks are 
assigned to group 1 while the unsound banks are assigned to group 0. the 
function of the variables X…………..Xn that discriminates the variables into 
the  two  mutually  exclusive  and  exhaustive  categories,  the  sound  and 
unsound will be a linear combination of the Xi  explanatory variables such 
that the explicit presentation of the model takes the form 
Z = b1 x1+ b2x2 + b3x3…………bnxn 
Where Z = the discriminant variables-sound and unsound banks 
Xi =the explanatory variables namely,  insiders credit  to total  credit 
(InsCTC), Recapitalization requirement to total assets (RecapRTA), Capital 
to Risk weighted Asset ratio (CRWARatio), Nonperforming Loans to total 
Loans (NonPLTL), Average Liquidity Ratio (AVliqratio), Gross Loans to 
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Deposit  Ratio (GLoans DR) and ratio of insured deposit  to total deposits 
(RIDPTotal). 
Bi = the parameters to be estimated.
Result and Discussions  
The predictive model for the standardized canonical discriminant function is 
estiamated and stated thus, 
Z = -0.055 InsCTC + 0.002RecapRTA +0.189 CRWAratio +1.117 
NopLTL  + 0.404 AvLiqratio + 0.193 GLoansDR + 0.158 RIDeptotal.
With this result in view, the percentage contribution of individual variables 
to the total discriminant score is calculated in table 6, having determined the 
mean difference of the variables as presented in table 5.
Table 5 Group Means and Mean Difference for Discriminating Variables 
Variables Sound Banks Unsound Banks Mean Difference
InsCTC 6.9222 9.5889 2.6667
RECAPRTA 1.3333 41.3778 40.0445
CRWARatio 12.8000 -91.2433 -104.0445
NonPLTL 23.2233 72.5989 49.3747
AvLiqratio 22.0078 -1.63900 -23.6468
GLoansDR 78.1956 1.462900 -76.7327
RIDPTotal 21.0278 45.6067 24.5789
Source: Author’s Computation 
Table 6 Percentage Contribution of Individual Variables Total Discriminant Scores
Variables Coefficients Mean 
Differences 
Product Percentage 
Contribution
InsCTC -0.055 2.667 -0.1467 0.14
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RecapRTA 0.002 40.0445 0.0801 0.08
CRWARatio 0.189 -104.0433 -19.6642 19.00
NonPLTL 1.117 49.3747 55.1515 53.40
AVLiqratio 0.404 -23.6468 -9.5533 9.25
GLoansDR 0.193 -76.7327 14.8094 14.34
RIDPTotal 0.158 24.5789 3.8835 3.76
103.2887 100
 Source: Author’s Computation
The above table shows that variables such as nonperforming loans to 
total loans, capital to risk weighted asset ratio, gross loans to deposit ratio 
and  average  liquidity  ratio  made  remarkable  contributions  to  the  total 
discriminant scores. Nonperforming loans contributed about 53.40% of the 
total discriminant scores for the function while capital to risk weighted asset 
follows, with 19% to group separation of the discriminant function. Gross 
laons to deposit ratio and average liquidity ratio made poor contributions of 
14.34%  and  9.25%  respectively.  Insured  credit  to  total  credits  and 
recapitalization  requirement  to  total  asset  made  insignificant  contribution 
while ratio of insured deposits to total deposits made a minimal contribution 
of 3.76% to group separation of the discriminant function. In the light of the 
findings (see the product signs),  the chance of belonging to the group of 
unsound banks increases as its nonperforming loans and/or gross loans to 
deposit ratio increases. While it decreases with the increase in capital to risk 
weighted asset ratio and average liquidity ratio.
To verify the reliability of the function, we employ the Eigenvalues, 
Wilk’s Lambda that transforms into Chi square statistic and the canonical 
correlation measures summarized in table 7 as follows. 
Table 7 Wilk’s Lambda
Discriminan Eigenvales Canonical Wilk’s Chi- DF Significance 
15
t function correlation Lambda square level 
1 5.540 0.920 -0.153 23.475 7 0.001
Source: Author’s Computation
The Eigenvalue of the function is high,  the function is canonically 
highly  correlated  (92%),  indicating  high  association  between  the 
discriminant variables and the set of defined dummy variables. While the 
chi-square is significant, and hence establishing a prima facie evidence that 
differences exist between the group. The F statistic is also significant. Thus, 
the  hypothesis  that  all  the  discriminant  coefficients  are  equal  to  zero  is 
rejected;  the  estimated  function  therefore,  can  be  reliably  used  to 
discriminate between sound and unsound banks.
To show how well the banks are classified as sound and unsound, the 
classification  performance  of  the  estimated  discriminant  function  is 
presented in the table 8 below.
Table 8 Classification Result
                     
                             Z
Predicted group membership
Total
   0 1
Original Count 0
           1
Ungrouped cases 
         8
         0
         0
1
9
2
9
9
2
%        0
            1
Ungrouped cases
         88.9
         0
         0
11.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Cross-
validateda
Count  0
            1
         7
         0
2
9
9
9
%         0
             1
         77.8
          0
22.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
 a.  Cross  validation  is  done  only  for  those  cases  in  the  analysis.  In  cross  validation,  each 
case is classified by the functions derived from all cases other than that case. 
b.  94.4 % of original grouped cases correctly classified 
c.  88.9% of cross-validaed grouped cases correctly classified.
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From the above table, the sound banks are 100% correctly classified, 
but  the  proportion  of  unsound  banks  erroneously  classified  as  sound 
constitute about 11%. This kind of error constitutes a risk in banking sector. 
The 11%  unsound banks misclassified for sound banks may default in their 
performance due to misspecification error.
Conclusion 
The banking system categorized as sound or unsound was evaluated to 
determine the extent of discriminating power of the independent variables. 
The  explanatory  variables  used  are  the  insiders  credit  to  total  credit, 
recapitalization  requirement  to  total  assets,  capital  to  risk  weighted asset 
ratio, nonperforming loans to total loans, average liquidity ratio, gross loans 
to deposit ratio and insured deposit to total deposits.
The  finding  reveals  that  nonperforming  loans  to  total  loans 
contributed about 53.4% of the total discriminant scores for the function, 
while capital to risk weighted asset contributed 19% to the group separation 
of the discrimiant function.  Others are gross loans to deposit  ratio which 
made  little  contribution  of  14.34%,  the  average  liquidity  ratio  that 
contributed 9.25% and the insured deposits to total deposit that made 3.76% 
contribution. The rest of the variables made insignificant contributions. By 
this analysis, order of severity of the institutional factors that could lead to 
bank distress has been identified.
The policy implication of this is that the chance of belonging to the 
group of  unsound banks increases  profoundly as its  nonperforming loans 
and/or gross loans to deposit ratio increases.
The  25  percent  non  scientifically  determined  component  weight 
attached to asset quality in CAMEL rating should be increased to at least 1/3 
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(30%) of the total  weight components  since its  components  are found to 
dominate the discriminant score. While the weights attached to other factors 
in  CAMEL  rating  with  the  exception  of  capital  should  be  adjusted 
downwards to accommodate the 100 percent score point. The rightful and 
more scientific attachment of weights to CAMEL components will prevent 
the banking sector from misclassification error which constitutes a threat to 
the  performance  of  the  affected  banks  and  the  economy  at  large.  The 
nonperforming loans to total loans which play a dominant role in leading to 
unsoundness of the banking system should be given priority regulatory and 
supervisory control.  Surveillance should however not  be neglected on all 
others,  especially  the capital  risk weighted asset  ratio,  the gross loans to 
deposit ratio and the average liquidity ratio.  
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